Ben Arnovitz v. John Louis Tella : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1971
Ben Arnovitz v. John Louis Tella : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Richard H. Moffitt; Attorney for Defendant and RespondentFrancis J. Nielson; Attorney for Plaintiff
and Appellant
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Arnovitz v. Tella, No. 12491 (Utah Supreme Court, 1971).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/3160
IN 1HE SUPREME COURT 
OF 1HE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEN ARNOVITZ, 
Plaintiff and A'P'Pellant, 
vs. 
JOHN LOUIS TELLA, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
12491 
Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County, Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson 
F·RANCIS J. NIELSON 
1309 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
RICHARD H. MOFFITT 
9th Floor Tribune Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
FILED 
f-\ Li(' .1 ,, '10-;· 1 'l! ~ ~J _; J 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
NATURE OF CASE_ 
DISPOSITION IN LOW-Ei-COURT __________________________________ ~ 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL ______ :------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACT -------------------------------
ARGUMENT --------------------~--:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: i 
POINT I 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED 
TO ALLOW APPELLANT TO INTRO-
DUCE INTO EVIDENCE THE TESTI-
MONY OF EYE WITNESSES TO THE 
COLLISION THAT THE RESPONDENT 
APPEARED TO BE ANGRY AS HE 
BACKED HIS CAR INTO THE APPEL-
LANT'S CAR ------------------------------------------------------------ 3 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT, 
NUMBER THREE OF THE COURT 
THAT THE FORCE AND IMPACT OF 
THE INITIAL COLLISION PROPELLED 
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE FORWARD 
WITH SUCH FORCE THAT THE FRONT 
SEAT OF SAID VEHICLE WAS TORN 
LOOSE FROM THE FLOOR OF SAID 
VEHICLE, THE CARBURETOR LINK-
AGE GOVERNING THE ACCELERATOR 
OR THROTTLE WAS BROKEN CAUS-
ING THE VEHICLE TO OPERATE UN-
CONTROLLABLY IN "FULL ACCELER-
ATION," AND THE TRANSMISSION OF 
THE VEHICLE WAS FORCED INTO RE-
VERSE GEAR EITHER BY THE IM-
P A CT ITSELF OR BY THE DEFEN-
DANT'S INVOLUNTARY ACTIONS AS 
A DIRECT RESULT OF THE FORCE OF 
THE IMPACT, WHICH RESULTED IN 
THE SECOND COLLISION AS A DIRECT 
AND PROXIMATE CA USE OF THE 
FIRS-T COLLISION· AND- PLAINTIFF'S 
NEGLIGENCE---------------------------------------------------------- 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW OF THE COURT 
THAT THE DEFENDENT WAS EN-
TIRELY FREE FROM ANY NEGLI-
GENCE, MALICE, OR INTENT WHAT-
Page 
SOEVER -------------------------------------------------------------------- 15 
POU~T IV 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW 
NUMBER ONE OF THE COURT THAT 
THE NEGLIGENCE OF APPELLANT 
WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CA USE 
OF A SECONDARY COLLISION WHICH 
OCCURED BET\VEEN VEHICLES OV.'N-
ED AND OPERA TED BY THE APPEL-
LANT AND THE RESPONDENT ON OR 
ABOUT THE 8th DAY OF JUNE, 1970, 
APPROXIMATELY 60 FEET WEST OF 
THE INTERSECTION OF S E C 0 N D 
SOUTH AND SECOND EAST, SALT 
LAKE CITY, UTAH ------------------------------------------------ 15 
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE 
VALUE OF THE DEFENDANT'S VE-
HICLE WAS $500.00 ---------------------------------------------- 16 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
CASES CITED 
Fritz vs. Western U. Teleg. Company, 
(1903) 25 Utah 263, 71 P. 209 ---------------------------------- 6 
In re Miller's Estate, (1909) 36 Utah 1228, 102 P. 996 ---- 7 
TEXTS CITED 
69 A.L.R. 1168 -----·-················-··········-··---·······-········-----·-······· 7 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
BEN ARNOVITZ, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
JOHN LOUIS TELLA, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
12491 
This is an action by the plaintiff Ben Arnovitz 
to i·ecover damages for injury to his person and prop-
erty resulting from an automobile collision between 
appellant and respondent in which respondent 
counterclaimed for damages to his automobile. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A Trial was held before the Honorable Joseph 
G. Jeppson of the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah. The Judge rendered Judgment 
in favor of the defendant and against plaintiff 
for no cause of action and in favor of defendant and 
against plaintiff on the defendant's Counter-claim 
in the sum of $500.00 damages together with interest 
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at the rate of six ( 6%) per cent per annum from 
June 8, 1970, until date of entry of the Judgment 
and thereafter at the rate of eight (8%) per cent 
per annum until satisfied and costs of $18.10. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the Judgment for 
no cause of action on his claim and a reversal of the 
Judgment in favor of respondent on respondent's 
counter-claim and if the Court deems it just an order 
remanding the action to the District Court for a new 
trial to comply with the findings of this Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about the 8th day of June, 19701 at ap-
proximately 4 :00 P.M. in the afternoon the vehicle 
of the respondent and counterclaimant was bmnped 
from the rear by a vehicle owned and driven by the 
appellant in an initial collision and the vehicle of the 
respondent then backed into the vehicle of the appel-
lant in a second collision, both collisions occurring 
near the intersection of Second South and Second 
East in Salt Lake City. Both vehicles were traveling 
in an easterly direction. 
The appellant was proceeding in an easterly 
direction along Second South in the City of Salt 
Lake approaching its intersection with Second East. 
Respondent was also driving an automobile in an 
easterly direction along Second South traveling in 
the same lane a short distance in front of appellant. 
When the automobile in which respondent was riding 
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approached the intersection of Second South and Sec-
ond East appellant's automobile bumped the respond-
ent's automobile causing little or no damage to re-
spondent's and appellant's cars and no injuries to 
either driver. Respondent's car then backed into the 
appellant's car causing a second collision much more 
severe than the first in which both cars were severely 
damaged. The appellant was taken by ambulance 
to the Holy Cross Hospital and treated for lacera-
tions in the nose requiring a total of 10 stitches, 
bruises on the chest, abdomen, ribs, and knees, and 
multiple lacerations and contusions on the nose and 
right chest. Respondent was not injured. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT IMPROPERLY REFUSED TO 
ALLOW APPELLANT 'TO INTRODUCE INTO 
EVIDENCE THE TESTIMONY OF EYE WIT-
NESSES TO THE COLLISION THAT THE RE-
SPONDENT APPEARED TO BE ANGRY AS 
HE BACKED HIS CAR INTO THE APPEL-
LANT'S CAR. 
Appellant alleged in his complaint that the re-
spondent "willfully, wantonly, and maliciously back-
ed his car into the plaintiff's car with such force as 
to cause the injuries to plaintiff hereinafter alleged." 
Appellant contended that because of the provo-
cation of the initial collision respondent became 
angry and in the heat of that anger intentionally 
backed his car into appellant's car causing injuries 
to appellant out of which this law suit arose. Thus, 
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appellant's case turned on whether or not he could 
establish respondent's intent. 
In seeking to establish the respondent's intent 
to back his automobile into appellant, the witnesses 
were questioned as to any emotion exhibited by the 
respondent as he was proceeding in reverse toward 
appellant. (R. P. 11-12) 
Q. When you first observed Mr. Tella 
proceeding in reverse were you close enough 
to observe his demeanor at all? 
THE COURT: I don't know what you 
mean, demeanor. 
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Could you see any 
emotion exhibited by Mr. Tella? 
A. Well, as I said-
MR. MOFFITT: I object to that, Your 
Honor, he can testify to what he actually ob-
served, but emotion .isn't something that you 
can see. 
THE COURT: That's what he is asking 
for, overruled. 
MR. NIELSON: You may answer. 
THE COURT: While the defendant was 
going to reverse. 
THE \VITNESS: He appeared angry. 
MR. MOFFITT: I object to that, Your 
Honor, that is a conclusion. 
THE COURT: It's a conclusion, and it 
is stricken. Will you state what you saw that 
made you come to that conclusion? You may 
testify to that. 
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Q. (By Mr. Nielson) How do you draw 
the conclusion, Mr. Jensen, that Mr. Tella was 
somehow angry? 
MR. MOFFITT: I object to that again, 
you are asking for a conclusion, in effect. He 
can testify as to what he saw. 
THE COURT: You may testify. Over-
ruled. 
THE WITNESS: Well, he acted as 
though he were-
THE COURT: What did he do? 
THE WITNESS: Well, as I said, he 
looked over his shoulder, he watched where he 
was driving. And he was driving rapidly and 
smashed into Mr. Arnovitz's car. (R. P. 24) 
Q. Mrs. Jensen, could you please tell us 
what you observed about Mr. Tella that he 
was somehow angry? 
MR. MOFFIT: I object, it is leading. 
THE COURT : Sustained. Stricken. 
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Was Mr. Tella 
angry when he was backing? 
MR. MOFFITT: Objection, that is ask-
ing for a conclusion. (R. P. 28-29) 
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) I asked this ques-
tion of your husband, Mrs. Jensen, I would 
like to ask you as Mr. Tella's car was in re-
verse did you notice anything about his de-
meanor? 
THE COURT: I don't know what you 
mean by demeanor. Are you asking for facial 
expression, or are you asking for the operation 
of the car? 
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lViR. NIELSON: I'm asking for facts 
concerning Mr. Tella's position in the car, and 
which would indicate any emotion on his part. 
THE COURT: When the defendant was 
backing what did you observe about him? 
THE WITNESS: Well, he looked-as 
he was going back? 
THE COURT: Yes. What did you see 
about him as he was going back? 
THE WITNESS: Well, that he was in 
a hurry or backing fast, all I know is that he 
was sure-
The court disallowed the witnesses' testin1ony 
as to the emotion exhibited on the grounds that they 
were drawing a conclusion. This court in the past 
has allowed testimony relating to exhibited emotions. 
In Fritz v. Western Union Tel. Co. (1903) 25 
Utah 263, 71 P. 209, a telegraph company was sued 
for the death of one of its linemen while putting up a 
wire. It appeared that the deceased lineman was 
directed to take the place of another workman who 
had received a shock from the telegraph wire while 
pulling on it, and who stated that fact to deceased. 
This workman was asked with regard to the appear-
ance of deceased at the time he came to take his place, 
as to whether deceased appeared to realize there was 
any danger, - and answered that he appeared as 
though there was no danger, and looked at the wit-
ness in a disgusted way, as much as to say that the 
witness did not know anything about it. 
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This court allowed the testimony stating that it 
was not objectionable, in stating a conclusion: 
"The statement as to the appearance of 
another is a fact, and not a conclusion-" 
lnln Re Miller's Estate (1909) 36 Utah 228, 102 P. 
996, an action was brougq.t to revoke a Will on the 
ground of undue influence. ~'itnesses' testimony 
was admitted as to testator's "feelings" toward her 
children; that the second wife "hated" them; that 
"he was cowed down by her" and that at times she 
was "bitter " "agitated" and in "a state of sun-
' ' J: 
pressed excitement"; and that the testator "always 
manifested the greatest affection for his children," 
and that his demeanor toward them was "affection-
ate." 
This Court has admitted testimony into evidence 
on a b1·oad range of emotions including anger. The 
lower Court erred in ref using to allow testimony of 
eye witnesses relating to the emotion of anger ex-
hibited by respondent as he was proceeding in re-
verse toward appellant's automobile. 
In 69 A.L.R. 1168 the above facts are supported: 
"It is generally held that a witness may 
testify as to the emotions mainfested by an-
other and observed by him. Evidence of the 
existence or absence of the emotions of fear, 
anger, joy, excitement, nervousness, earnest-
ness, anxiety, disgust, curiosity, surprise, em-
barassment, sympathy, despondency, displea-
sure, satisfaction, and the like, has thus been 
admitted. The competency of such testimony 
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is based on necessity. Since it is well-nigh im-
possible to describe another's appearance in 
such manner as to convey to a jury an accur-
ate picture of the emotion manifested by him 
at a given time, the admission of such evidence 
is not open to common objection to nontechni-
cal opinion evidence, that the function of the 
jury is being usurped. In answer to the con-
tention that one may not testify as to the state 
of mind or mention cognition of another, it is 
frequently said that one's appearance under 
stress of an emotion is a fact; and to say that 
another, appeared to be excited at a given time 
is not an opinion or conclusion, but is the 
statement of a fact, within the common 
knowledge of all persons of normal under-
standing. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT, NUM-
BEE THREE OF THE COURT THAT THE 
FORCE AND IMP ACT OF THE INITIAL 
COLLISION PROPELLED DEFENDANT'S VE-
HICLE FORWARD WITH SUCH FORCE THAT 
THE FRONT SEAT OF SAID VEHICLE WAS 
TORN LOOSE FROM THE FLOOR OF SAID 
VEHICLE, THE CARBURETOR LINKAGE 
GOVERNING THE ACCELERATOR OR 
THROTTLE WAS BROKEN CAUSING THE 
VEHICLE TO OPERATE UNCONTROLLABLY 
IN "FULL ACCELERATION," AND THE 
THE TRANSMISSION OF THE VEHICLE WAS 
FORCED INTO REVERSE GEAR EITHER BY 
THE IMP ACT ITSELF OR BY THE DEFEND-
ANT'S INVOLUNTARY ACTIONS AS A 
DIRECT RESULT OF THE FORCE OF THE IM-
PACT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE SECOND 
COLLISION AS A DIRECT AND PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF THE FIRST COLLISION AND 
PLAINTIIFF'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Witnesses testified that respondent was sitting 
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upright after the first collision, and had placed his 
right arm over the front seat and was looking back-
ward over his right shoulder as he proceeded in re-
verse. 
(R. P. 8) 
THE COURT: That is stricken. I asked 
you to just testify to what you saw, not what 
he had to do. 
THE WITNESS: His car started back-
mg up. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: He was watching 
where he was backing. He was looking over 
his shoulder. And he backed up a very rapid 
speed, I would estimate he was pushing his 
accelerator down. 
(R. P. 37) 
Q. Did you observe the collision after 
Mr. Tella was backing up? 
A. Yes. In my rear view mirror I 
noticed him backing up and it seemed strange 
to me so I watched in my rear view mirror. 
Q. What do you mean it seemed strange? 
A.Well, that the automobile was backing 
up after it had been hit and knocked forward. 
And Mr. Tella had his right arm over the back 
of the front seat and he was looking over his 
right shoulder as he was backing up. 
Since the second collision was more severe than 
the first the correct inference from the evidence 
would be that the seat was torn loose during the sec-
ond collision. 
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(R. P. 49) 
Q. You testified you saw both collisions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I would like to know, I would like 
to have you make a comparison between the 
severity of the two collisions. 
MR. MOFFITT: I object, Your Honor. 
I think he has got to tell us what he saw, but I 
don't think he can make the conclusion. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
THE WITNESS: I would say that the 
second collision was about twice as severe as 
the first one. 
Q. Did you see any dents? 
A. There were very small-I don't think 
any headlights had been damaged at all, but 
there was a few dents on the front of his car 
where a bumper had hit. 
As to the second collision the witness testified: 
(R. P. 49-50) 
Q. You testified you parked your car, 
got out and then went to the scene of the colli-
sion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have a chance to observe 
clearly and closely both cars at the scene of the 
accident? 
A. Fairly clear. 
Q. vVould you describe for us the dam-
age to Mr. Arnovitz's car first? 
,. 
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A. It was extensively damaged in the 
front end. The grill and the headlight, I be-
lieve, had been damaged and broken out. The 
front end had been pushed back to approxi-
mately one foot and that was about all. 
Q. Did you notice anything, any dam-
age to Mr. Tella's car? 
A. Just where there was dents in the 
trunk and the back where the light, you know, 
sticks out from the body. And there was dents 
on the fender. 
No evidence was introduced that the initial col-
lision caused the carburetor linkage governing the 
accelerator or throttle to break causing the vehicle 
engine to operate uncontrollably in "full accelera-
tion." 
(R. P. 93-94) 
Q. Mr. Tella, have you ever had any 
problem with your accelerator before? 
it? 
A. No, Sir. 
Q. Never before? 
A. Never. 
Q. Did you have a mechanic examme 
A. You don't examine anything until 
something goes wrong with it. 
Q. After this occurrence? 
A. Yes, it was checked. It was broken 
off. It was hit with such impact. 
THE COURT: What was broken off? 
11 
THE WITNESS: The accelerator arm 
to the carburetor. 
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Were you the one 
that first noticed that? 
A. I knew it when the car wouldn't turn 
off, the engine racing wildly, that's when I 
knew it was stuck. 
Q. Did you ever have a competent mech-
anic examine the car after this accident? 
A. No, sir. 
It is impossible to conclude from the evidence 
that the initial collision caused the damage to the car-
buretor linkage governing the accelerator. Since an 
eye witness observed the two collisions and testified 
that the second was at least twice as severe as the 
first the logical conclusion would be that the damage 
was done upon the second collision. 
The lower court also had no basis for holding 
that the transmission of respondent's vehicle was 
forced into reverse gear by the impact of the initial 
collision or by respondent's involuntary actions re-
sulting from the force of the first impact. 
The testimony of the eye witnesses to the colli-
sion indicated that very little or no damage appeared 
on either car after the first collision. This would 
indicate that the impact was very mild and certainly 
not severe enough to force the transmission of the 
respondent's vehicle into reverse or cause his arms to 
flail in a manner which would force the gear into re-
verse. 
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(R. P. 18-19, 43, 44) 
Q. But you didn't see an impact prior to 
the time of the colliison that occurred when 
the Tella vehicle went back? 
A. Absolutely not. This is the first time 
I saw them, they were thirty feet apart, or 
more. 
Q. At that point did you observe any 
damage on either of the vehicles? 
A. No, none. 
Q. Was there any, or did you just not 
observe it? 
A. There was none-there had been no 
contact. 
Q. They had not? 
A. Well, I had seen no contact. 
Q. You said they had not, do you know 
that they had not? 
A. I can't swear to that. 
Q. Can you swear there was no damage 
on either vehicle at that time? 
A. There was no observable. 
Q. That you did in fact did observe? 
A. I could have seen it if there had been 
any severe damage. 
THE COURT: Do you see any damage 
on the defendant's automobile before it back-
ed? 
THE WITNESS: No. 
THE COURT: Any on the other car? 
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THE WITNESS: No, I didn't observe. 
THE COURT: Or did you look and no 
see any? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I didn't look at 
the back of the car when it was backinp up. 
Q. Did you see any dents? 
A. There were very small-I don't think 
any headlights had been damaged at all, but 
there was a few dents on the front of his car 
where a bumper had hit. 
The testimony of the respondent indicated that 
it was necessary to manipulate the gear shaft in 
order to get it into reverse position. 
(R. P. 92, 96) 
Q. You heard the various witnesses 
testify, Mr. Tella, that you backed into Mr. 
Arnovitz's car. Could you tell us how your car 
got into reverse position? 
A. I don't know exactly how the car got 
into reverse position. I know the first impact 
was violent enough to break the seat loose, 
throwing me backwards. Now, whether my 
hand came down automatically on that and 
threw it into reverse or whether the impact 
on the mechanism did it itself, I don't know. 
But the car did go into reverse and backed 
into Mr. Arnovitz's car. 
Q. (By Mr. Nielson) Now, Mr. Tella, 
on most cars that I have driven to get it into 
reverse you must position the gear shift lever 
correctly or you cannot move it. Now, on your 
car was it necessary for you to pull the gear 
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shift lever forward or backward in order to 
get it into position? 
A. I never tried to get it in position 
without lifting up. Other than that I can't 
answer that question. 
Q. Normally you lift it up? 
A. In the normal position. 
The evidence does not justify a holding that the force 
of the initial impact, which was much less severe than 
the second, mysteriously forced respondent's trans-
mission into reverse. No evidence was introduced 
as to how thiR would be mechanically feasible. 
Since the lever requires conscious manipulation 
to be put into reverse as shown by the above testi-
mony the court was not justified in holding that 
respondent's involuntary actions resulting from the 
initial impact forced the lever into reverse. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT '.AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW OF THE COURT THAT 
THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTIRELY FREE 
FROM ANY NEGLIGENCE, MALICE, OR IN-
TENT WHATSOEVER. 
The testmony of eye witnesses relating to the 
emotion of anger exhibited by respondent was im-
properly excluded by the lower court and would have 
established malice. 
POINT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION OF LAW NUM-
BER ONE OF THE COURT THAT THE NEGLI-
GENCE OF APPELLANT WAS THE SOLE 
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PROXIMATE CAUSE OF A SECONDARY 
COLLISION WHICH OCCURED BETWEEN 
VEHICLES OWNED AND OPERERATED BY 
THE APPELLANT AND THE RESPONDENT 
ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JUNE, 1970, 
APPROXIMATELY 60 FEET WEST OF THE 
INTERSECTION OF SECOND SOUTH AND 
SECOND EAST, SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH. 
The question as to how the respondent's vehicle 
got into reverse gear is dispositive of this issue. 
This question has been clarified above. 
POINT V. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT THE FINDING OF FACT 'AND 
CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT THE VALUE OF 
THE DEFENDANT'S VEHIICLE WAS $500.00. 
Respondent's vehicle was never appraised as to 
its value prior to the collision. Newspaper advertise-
ments introduced into evidence showing prices of 
similar cars are irrelevant as to the actual worth of 
the respondent's automobile. Thus the holding that 
the respondent vehicle was worth 500.00 prior to the 
collision is unsupported by the evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
Since appellant's case depended upon establish-
ing an intentional act on the part of the respondent 
the Court's refusal to admit testimony as to respond-
ent's emotion as he was proceeding in reverse toward 
appellant's vehicle was extremely prejudicial to ap-
pellant and is grounds for reversal of the judgment 
in the lower court. Utah law as to the admissibilty 
of testimony regarding emotions is clear. The cases 
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hold that an observed emotion is a fact not a conclu-
s10n. 
The holding by the lower court that the initial 
collision was responsible for the second collision is 
unsupported by the evidence in the record. The only 
plausible explanation as to how respondent initially 
got into reverse is that he intentionally manipulated 
the lever to the reverse position in a fit of anger 
brought on by the provocation of the initial impact. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANCIS J. NIELSON 
1309 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
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